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Abstract
This article examines the changing dynamics of relations between the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It argues that
while the PLA remains politically loyal to the CCP, there is evidence of important
changes in the institutional relationship between the two institutions. The party-
army relationship is no longer as intertwined and symbiotic as it has historically
been; rather, this article argues that there is evidence of a 'bifurcation' between the
two. The catalysts for this change have been the professionalization and relative
depoliticization of the military, as well as the leadership transition in the CCP.
These changes raise important and central issues for the future of Chinese politics.*
Introduction
As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has had to adapt to changes in
Chinese society during the reform period and in the wake of the col-
lapse of communist party-states elsewhere,1  it has also had to adjust
and renegotiate its relationship with other key organs of state power.2
Among these has been the party's relationship with the People's Lib-
eration Army (PLA). Yet the renegotiated relationship has occurred not
just between party and army, but also between both and a third party:
the state. Since the mid-1990s there has been an evident, if subterra-
nean, three-way struggle over the jurisdictional control of the military
being played out among the army, party and government in China. The
army has sought greater autonomy from party control so as to better
pursue its redefined professional missions, which has forced the party
to redefine and adjust its instruments of control over the army, while
the government (state) has tried to increase its own jurisdictional con-
trol over the armed forces while continuing to delineate its sphere of
responsibilities distinct from the party (dang-zheng fenkai).
While this subterranean struggle has been evident to careful observ-
ers, because of their inherently political and highly sensitive nature,
these changes have been only incremental and subliminal. They rarely
spill over into the public domain. No explicit and radical restructuring
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of party-army relations has been undertaken. To do so would call into
question the very legitimacy of the CCP as a ruling party. The
longstanding Maoist paradigm that the 'party controls the gun' remains
standard mantra (tifa) and is, in fact, still the case. We certainly cannot
claim that the army has gained its 'independence' from party control.
The army would certainly follow orders from the party leadership to
use force against external threats and most likely against internal ones
as well. The army does remain loyal to the party. There is no danger of
a military coup d'état of the army against the party, as is often the case in
other one-party authoritarian states. Nonetheless, as this paper argues,
there do exist growing signs of 'bifurcation' between these two institu-
tions – which cumulatively add up to a significant, and ongoing, re-
definition of the institutional and jurisdictional relationship between
the CCP and PLA.
From Party-Army to Civil-Military Relations
Western analysts of the PLA have long considered it more appropriate
to use the term 'party-army relations' rather than the more generic term
'civil-military relations,' as commonly used elsewhere in the world. This
was so because of a number of important historical considerations that
set the PLA's relationship to the ruling Chinese Communist Party apart
from its counterparts in other countries. It was recognized that militaries
in communist political systems are intrinsically and inherently differ-
ent from other one-party authoritarian systems, to say nothing of
militaries in democratic polities.
In communist party-led political systems (the People's Republic of
China included) the military is an institutional and armed instrument
of the party. Communist militaries do not exhibit the degree of 'corpo-
rate' identity and political autonomy characteristic of Western militaries.
This is so for a number of reasons. The first is that the act of seizing –
and maintaining – power is usually a violent one, in which armed force
is used for political ends. This fact intrinsically places the military (and
other coercive security services) in the position of being an armed ad-
junct of the party rather than as an autonomous force charged with
defending the nation against external threat.3  As such, a communist
military's national security mission is a dual one – to be used against
both internal and external enemies. Moreover, communist militaries (in-
cluding the PLA) are institutionally penetrated by the ruling commu-
nist party – particularly through a network of political commissars, party
committees and other mechanisms. This is the essence of Leninist par-
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ties – to penetrate institutionally all key organs of state and society. Yet
it is not simply an issue of zero-sum penetration, but also a positive
sum relationship whereby the army is given an important stake in the
ruling party. One way this is done is to co-opt the military elite into the
party elite. In the PLA, all officers above the rank of Senior Colonel are
party members. This is even more evident at the top of the political
system through the 'interlocking directorate,' where there is usually a
high percentage of senior serving military officers on the party's elite
organs (the Central Committee and Political Bureau), with many more
senior party officials having previously served in the armed forces (trad-
ing their uniforms for civilian garb but maintaining close factional ties
with military elites). In such communist militaries, 'political work' and
ideological indoctrination of the officer corps and the rank and file are
prominent and occupy considerable time (net time not spent in training).
In short, in communist militaries (including the PLA), there exists an
essential symbiosis between the army and ruling communist party. Some-
times this symbiosis is reflected in party attempts to assert greater con-
trol over the military, while at other times communist militaries have
become more politically assertive vis-à-vis the ruling party – although
in such systems, because of the essential symbiosis, militaries do not
engineer coups d'état against their ruling parties (although they may
become involved in intra-party factional manoeuvring).
Such a model of party-army relations was wholly applicable to China
until the second half of the 1990s, although I argue in this paper that it
has been only partially applicable since that time. For a variety of rea-
sons and judged by a variety of indicators, the relationship between the
PLA and the CCP is evolving significantly and possibly transforming
fundamentally. To be sure, it is still a party-army in important respects,
but a number of the criteria noted above no longer characterize the CCP–
PLA relationship. The military's mission today is almost exclusively
external, to protect national security rather than internal security (the
People's Armed Police has been created to take primary responsibility
for this mission). Importantly, the 'interlocking directorate' has been
completely broken by generational succession, whereby not a single
senior party leader today possesses a single day of military experience
and, currently, only two senior PLA officers in the High Command (Gen-
erals Chi Haotian and Wang Ruilin) have any significant experience in
high-level politics – a trend that will become more pronounced with
the transition to the 'fourth generation' CCP leadership. The party-army
elite has clearly become 'bifurcated' from each other.
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Another change is that the criteria for career advancement in the PLA
are no longer as dependent on political factors. Senior PLA officers from
the Central Military Commission down to Group Army commands are
now promoted on meritocratic and professional criteria, while political
consciousness and activism count for very little. The officer corps is
becoming increasingly professional in classic Huntingtonian terms. In-
deed, recruitment into the PLA is now based almost exclusively on tech-
nical criteria. The role of the ideology is virtually nil and political work
has declined substantially; concomitantly the General Political Depart-
ment's mission has become more oriented to providing welfare for sol-
diers and their families than to indoctrinating them. Time formally spent
in political study (approximately 30 percent in the past) is now spent in
training. Political work (zhengzhi gongzuo) itself is now much more ori-
ented towards welfare, morale and living issues than to ideological in-
doctrination. This is also true of curriculum content in institutions of
professional military education (PME), now mandatory for all officers
above the division level. Officers spend time learning the intricacies of
doctrine, strategy and tactics rather than communist doctrine. With com-
mercial divestiture, time formerly spent in business is now also spent
increasingly in training, as PLA units have been ordered to divest them-
selves of their commercial holdings. The military is also now subject to
control by a large number of formal laws and regulations, instead of the
informality and personalization of command and control. The State
Council and Ministry of Finance are now exerting much stronger con-
trol over the PLA budgeting process, and at least on paper (the Na-
tional Defence Law) the President and National People's Congress pos-
sess command and oversight responsibilities over the PLA.
Accordingly, for these reasons, it is now more analytically appropri-
ate to consider civil-military rather than party-army relations in the PRC.
The driving catalyst for all of these changes has been the profes-
sionalization of the armed forces.4  To be sure, as is argued below, this
evolution is ongoing and incomplete. The former model has not, and is
not likely to, replace completely the latter model. Yet, along a number
of criteria, it does seem clear that the PLA is moving away from its
traditional communist institutional ethos into a new stage of limited
autonomy from the ruling party.
Theoretically, in terms of the comparative study of civil-military sys-
tems, this new stage may also be viewed as the intermediate stage in a
transition from a party-army to a 'national army'. China and the PLA
are clearly not there yet, and it is very questionable whether a national
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army can exist within the context of a political system dominated by a
single, ruling communist party. Yet there have been, and continue to be,
subterranean discussions in China and the PLA about greater state con-
trol of the military, a military that serves the nation and not just the
ruling party, and a military controlled by civilian rule and governed
my legislative oversight. As if to put a fine point on the sensitivity of
such considerations, there has been a series of ongoing condemnations
of such 'bourgeois' concepts in the party and military media from time
to time. It is clearly a sensitive issue that cuts right to the core of PLA
identity and CCP legitimacy, if not the efficacy of the PRC itself.
Is it feasible to have a national army in a Leninist system? Or can
such a military only exist in a democratic system? Given the evidence
of economic and educational reforms in China, to take but two issue
areas, it is not inconceivable that a hybrid relationship of a professional
national military could co-exist with a ruling communist party, but
within a framework of state and legislative control. Yet, on the other
hand, many of the elements necessary to proclaim the PLA a 'national
army' seem anathema to the CCP and its rule. For example, it would
require at least the following: a 'real' Ministry of National Defence (not
the hollow shell of the MND at present); a civilian Minister of Defence;
presidential chairmanship of the Central Military Commission; thor-
ough control of military by the state President, National People's Con-
gress, and State Council; a series of established laws and procedures
governing the use of force and mobilization of the military; strong leg-
islative oversight of the armed forces; complete budgetary control over
the military by the legislature and no extra-budgetary revenue; and no
political content in professional military education. Judged on these
criteria, it is clear that the PLA and China are a long way from becom-
ing a national army, yet there are discussions and tendencies in this
direction taking place in China and the PLA today.
To understand how the PLA and the CCP got to this stage, it is appro-
priate to understand some historical context, before considering the impli-
cations of recent changes that have occurred in civil-military relations.
Historical and Comparative Considerations
Any consideration of civil-military relations in China as it enters the
twenty-first century must proceed from clear cognizance of the past.
Over the last century, individual military actors and the military as an
institution have played key and active roles in the Chinese regime and
nation. This has taken a variety of forms over time, but the military has
15
Civil-Military Relations in China: Party-Army or National Military?
never been fully isolated from the political arena. Both military and
party elites have viewed military involvement in politics, domestic se-
curity, society and even commerce as legitimate. While the political in-
volvement of the Chinese military is distinct from the Western tradition
of military corporatism and separation from the political arena (based
on the Ottoman, European and American experiences5 ), it is hardly
unique among developing or socialist countries. Many post-colonial
and developing nations have experienced sustained military rule and
praetorian intervention,6 while most former communist party-states
were based on the 'interlocking directorate' of party and military elites
and the penetration of the military and security services by party con-
trol mechanisms.7  More recently, scholarly attention has been paid to
the military's withdrawal from politics and subordination to civilian
control in the process of the transition to democracy across the devel-
oping and industrializing world.8  An interesting literature has also be-
gun to address civil-military relations in the Chinese context of a de-
mocratizing Taiwan.9  Scholars specializing in post-1949 Chinese mili-
tary politics would do well to tap into all of these studies, as the PLA
shares many commonalities with these other cases. As professionalism
and corporate identity rise in the PLA, and greater efforts are made to
subject the military to state control, comparing other national experi-
ences will be increasingly pertinent to understanding the future evolu-
tion of the PLA.10
Understanding the interrelationship among party, state and army in
the PRC today must also recognize several long-standing and unique
features of civil-military relations in China historically. Throughout the
past century, from the late imperial to the post-Deng era, the Chinese
military has played an active role in the political and economic life of
the nation (even if soldiers, along with merchants, were at the bottom
of the Confucian social order). Key late-Qing reformers, such as Li
Hongzhang, were military men who believed that the path to 'wealth
and power' (fu-qiang, the cardinal tenet of all subsequent Chinese elites)
lay in mastering military technologies and building a strong self-de-
fence capability in order to rebuff foreign encroachment and regain
China's unity and lost greatness. Li's policy of 'building shipyards and
arsenals' and dispatching students to Europe and America to study in
defence colleges and scientific institutes bespoke this bias. To be sure,
heated debate existed among Qing elites over the wisdom of this policy
– some argued that it was a distorted path to development which dis-
proportionately emphasized military modernization over the need for
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a more comprehensive technological base; others opposed the inherent
'Westernization' and cultural contamination implicit in the strategy;
while still others believed that the 'sources of wealth and power' were
less technological and more civic, political and intellectual in nature.
These debates have resonated over the past century, and echoes of them
are still present today.
After the republican revolution of 1911, military elites remained
prominent in the new government (not the least of which was General
Yuan Shikai, who became the first President of the republic) and an
emphasis on building a modern military remained a high priority. With
Yuan's death in 1916, the ensuing constitutional crisis and failure of the
new regime to consolidate national power, China slipped into a pro-
longed period of territorial division, national fratricide and rule by an
ever-shifting variety of military warlords. This bloodthirsty period was
halted only when force was met with force during Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek's 1928 Northern Expedition, which united the country under
the civil-military rule of the Nationalist party and army (Kuomintang
and Kuominjun). The new KMT elite during the 'Nanjing decade' (1927-
37) contained a large proportion of military officers, secret police and
intelligence operatives – many trained under Chiang at the Whampoa
Military Academy and in military and paramilitary institutions in Ger-
many and the Soviet Union. This regime would only become more mili-
tarized following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937.11
Meanwhile, in the communist-controlled base areas of China's inte-
rior, a similar militarily dominant political regime was also taking shape.
The Red Army was born not only of necessity, out of the need literally
to fight for survival against Japanese and KMT forces, but also as a
result of the strong Soviet and German influences on the politicization
of the military and militarization of the party. Throughout the revolu-
tionary period an essential symbiosis existed between party and army
in pursuit of state power.12  The Chinese Communists' ultimate victory
in 1949 was at least as much a military as political one – as the Red
Army fought the Japanese invaders and defeated Kuomintang forces
on the battlefield, pacified the countryside, and occupied the cities.13
So closely intertwined were the institutions of party and army histori-
cally, that one must recognize the unique and often dominant roles that
the military has played, as a normative and institutional actor, in the
life of the nation. As Chairman Mao astutely observed, 'Political power
grows out of the barrel of a gun!' Yet, as early as 1929, Mao also warned
that, 'Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun
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must never be allowed to command the party.'14  Mao's edict actually
obscured the organic party-army symbiosis – a condition that obtained
until the 1980s when Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun began to imple-
ment reforms that had the net effect of incrementally increasing the corpo-
rate autonomy and separate identity of the armed forces vis-à-vis the CCP.
As a result of this symbiosis, the military came to the party's aid in sup-
pressing civil unrest at several key junctures after 1949 (not the least of
which during the Cultural Revolution). The CCP may have been born in
the Shanghai underground and Jiangxi Soviet, but it had militarist parent-
age and was reared on the battlefield. Its formative years were spent at
war, and it matured in a society with a strong militaristic tradition.
It was precisely because of this symbiotic relationship that the mili-
tary never balked when instructed to maintain social order, suppress
'counter-revolutionaries,' arrest the Gang of Four, or perform other in-
ternal security duties. In other words, involvement by the army in 'po-
litical' affairs and domestic security was considered normal and legiti-
mate, rather than a matter of intervention. This perspective also goes a
long way towards explaining the PLA's role in the 1989 suppression of
pro-democracy demonstrators and other citizens of Beijing, although
the questioning by some senior military elites of this action and insub-
ordination in the ranks at the time suggests the previous predominant
identity of symbiosis had begun to give way to one of greater 'autonomy'
of the armed forces vis-à-vis the Communist Party. Following the
Tiananmen crackdown there was a renewed attempt by the party (and
its constituent organs inside the PLA) substantially to increase control
over, and ensure the loyalty of, the military. But this only lasted a year
or two, and subsequently disparate signs of increased PLA 'autonomy'
became apparent. As is discussed below, one dimension of this increased
autonomy has been the tentative moves to increase state (i.e. govern-
ment and legislative) control over the military, as distinct from party
control. On the one hand, this does not mean that the longstanding
party-army symbiosis is inert; nor, on the other hand, does it mean that
a new era of a 'national army' (guomin jundui) or 'state army' (guojia
jundui) has dawned. But recent changes do indicate that the interrela-
tionship of party, army and state are in flux, and that the demands of
'professionalism' are redefining civil-military relations in China in di-
rections more familiar in other modernizing nations.
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The Impact of the Past on the Present
This background has profound implications for understanding Chinese
communist civil-military relations after the CCP came to power and in
the present period. Scholars in PLA studies have devoted substantial
analysis, and have had a lively discourse, on this issue in recent years.
Unfortunately, this discussion has taken place almost entirely among
PLA specialists, and has been largely sidelined to the periphery in the
field of Chinese political studies. In this discourse Ellis Joffe has noted
three schools of thought and lines of argument that have emerged over
time: symbiosis, party control and professionalism.15  Too often analysts have
juxtaposed these approaches whereas, as Joffe astutely notes, they should
be viewed as complementary. These are not mutually exclusive catego-
ries of analysis. Professionalism has been an ongoing process since the
1950s and Marshall Peng Dehuai's tenure as Minister of Defence. Even
under Marshall Lin Biao in the 1960s, and contrary to conventional wis-
dom, the military continued to professionalize and modernize in sev-
eral dimensions. If there has been a tension, it has been between party
control and limited military autonomy. While the norm of a symbiotic party-
army relationship has been sustained over time, in different periods
over the last 50 years (notably 1959-62, 1971-82 and 1989-92) the CCP
has taken extra efforts to exert control over the armed forces, while at
other junctures the military has sought to increase its corporate au-
tonomy from the CCP. On several occasions the military sought to exert
its role in the high-level party affairs  (notably 1967, 1976, 1989 and to a
certain extent in 1996), but it can be plausibly argued that this had more
do with certain elites 'pulling' the military into politics during periods
of social unrest and party weakness.16  In other periods (1954-59, 1974-
75, 1982-89) the armed forces have sought to increase their autonomy
from the party, but this must be carefully distinguished as limited au-
tonomy, as at no time has the PLA ever sought fully to separate itself
from the CCP (or vice versa).
The military has simply sought greater autonomy over affairs it con-
siders to be fully in its corporate domain – training, doctrine, force struc-
ture, personnel appointments, military education and protection of na-
tional security. Meanwhile, professional tendencies have been more or
less persistent over time, although with a particular emphasis in the
late-1950s, mid-1980s and late-1990s. The PLA has been, in Joffe's apt
phrase, a 'party-army with professional characteristics'.17  Thus, the ar-
my's relationship with the party-state has evolved and fluctuated over
time. Harry Harding has astutely noted that this fluctuation correlated
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as a function of the strength or weakness of the party-state.18  That is,
during periods when the party-state was strong and the society stable,
the military tended to act as a corporate bureaucratic lobby. When the
party-state was weakened, the military tended to act either as a politi-
cal arbiter between competing factions, support one faction against
another, or intervene more broadly to stabilize society.
Joffe's characterization remains partially apt today, although since
the mid-1990s we may have witnessed increasing military autonomy
from the party in general, as well as nascent signs of increased state (i.e.
government) control of the armed forces.19  This would suggest a slight
variation on his typology: a more linear evolution from symbiosis to con-
trol to limited autonomy. This is discussed at greater length above and
below, but suffice is to note here that increased state control need not
imply, ipso facto, the zero-sum displacement of the party's relationship
with the army. From one perspective, the relationship of the military to
the state and party can be seen as complementary. That is, the state may
be increasing its mechanisms of control and lines of authority over the
armed forces, while the party withdraws to a more 'elevated' position.
This has certainly been the case during the last decade in terms of the
party-state relationship with respect to economic management, whereby
the CCP sets forth the broader policy direction (fangzhen) while the state
formulates more concretely the policy line (luxian) and implements spe-
cific policies (zhengce). The issue here is really one of relative autonomy and
jurisdictional distinctions between institutional hierarchies and within func-
tional policy spheres (which some political scientists refer to as the 'zoning
of authority'). As the party has increasingly 'withdrawn' from its former
totalistic and monopolistic influence over society and economy, greater
'space' and relative autonomy have been created for institutional and civic
actors in China. While the tight symbiosis of party and army was forged
early on, it is necessarily one of the last bonds to be broken in the reform
process.
The Changing Rules of Civil-Military Relations
Since the 1990s the 'rules of the game' in civil-military relations in China
have changed as a result of several developments:
• The institutional narrowing of the arenas of interaction (to the CMC);
• The more limited range of issues on which PLA leaders have a
legitimate right to voice opinions, and their increasing reluctance
to do so;
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• Increased professionalism in the senior officer corps and a
concomitant decline in the promotion rates of officers with
backgrounds as political commissars;
• A PLA desire to concentrate solely on issues of 'army building' and
a generally non-interventionist approach to non-military issues;
• The creation of the PAP and concomitant disengagement of the PLA
from internal security functions;
• An implicit bargain struck between Jiang Zemin and the PLA High
Command that as long as he supports PLA budgets and professional
goals, they will defer to his leadership status.
The 'rules of the game' have also been changed fundamentally as, for
the first time, there now exist rules that define the military's functions
and roles. These have been codified in several laws, documents and
regulations in recent years. Their promulgation has been instrumental
in advancing the twin goals of regularization (zhengguihua) and
professionalization (zhiyehua) of the armed forces. The NPC has passed
12 laws and regulations, including: the National Defence Law, Military
Service Law, Military Facilities Protection Law, Civil Air Defence Law,
Reserve Officers Law, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Gar-
rison Law, Military Service Regulations, and Military Officers Ranks
and Regulations.20  The State Council and CMC have jointly adopted
40-odd administrative laws and regulations, and the CMC has imple-
mented 70-odd on its own, while individual PLA departments, service
arms and military regions have formulated more than one thousand
military rules and regulations.21  Taken together, the roles and functions
of the PLA are now specified as never before.
The National Defence Law (NDL) has significant implications for civil-
military relations. Adopted as law by the Fifth Session of the 8th National
People's Congress in March 1997 and authorized by Presidential Decree
No. 84, the National Defence Law is important for a number of reasons.22
The law went through five years of drafting and revision prior to its prom-
ulgation. This drafting process took place entirely within military legal
circles, as co-ordinated by the Military Legal Office of the CMC.23
The NDL provides an overall framework for 'administering the army
according to law' (yifa zhijun). The NDL elaborates in some detail vari-
ous aspects of the armed forces organization, duties, 'construction' and
legal responsibilities. It contains specific information about mobiliza-
tion for war, maintenance of the armed forces during peacetime, lead-
ership over the armed forces, the defence industrial and scientific es-
tablishment, military education and training, and many other aspects.
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These details are set forth in a lengthy document of 12 chapters and 70
articles. Associated publications interpret and spell out in further detail
the content and meaning of the provisions of the NDL.24
Among these areas of importance, the NDL is particularly striking
for one notable fact: the subordination of the military to the state. In
Chinese the clear connotation of the term for state (guojia) is govern-
ment, as distinct from the party. In China, this is operationalized to mean
the State Council and its constituent ministries and commissions, the
PRC President, as well as the National People's Congress (NPC). Begin-
ning in the 1980s there was a conscious and deliberate attempt more
clearly to demarcate the jurisdictional responsibilities of the CCP, State
Council and NPC – particularly the policy of 'separating party from
government' (dang-zheng fenkai) in economic policy-making and com-
mercial management. Of course, this general process required the prom-
ulgation of numerous laws and regulations which had the cumulative ef-
fect of strengthening the NPC as a fourth institutional pillar of the PRC,
along with the party, army and government. In the process, the NPC itself
gained increased oversight functions vis-à-vis the government. State Coun-
cil policies, budgets and appointments became at least nominally subject
to legislative review by the NPC. However, the Communist Party as an
institution has always insisted that it should police itself and its own mem-
bership, and this remains unchanged. This has included party members in
the armed forces, who are subject to the CCP's Discipline Inspection Com-
mission system. The CCP accordingly has its own constitution and its own
'election' procedures for its leadership. The party is clearly separated from
the state. Its relationship to the armed forces has always been one of sym-
biosis and/or control. Certainly, the party has institutionally penetrated
the military to ensure this relationship.
However, the 1997 National Defence Law suggests some fundamen-
tal departures in the relationship of the military to the party and state.
In a number of its articles, and in several significant respects, the NDL
clearly subordinates the 'armed forces' (which is defined as including
the People's Armed Police, militia, and reserves) to the state. The term
'state' (guojia) is mentioned no fewer than 39 times in the law. Lest there
be any ambiguity about the implications of this term, and the institu-
tional subordination of the armed forces to state control, it is specified
in some detail. Only in a single clause is the relationship of the army to
the party mentioned (Article 19): 'The armed forces of the People's Re-
public of China are subject to leadership by the Communist Party, and
CCP organizations in the armed forces shall conduct activities in accord-
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ance with the CCP constitution' (i.e. presumably with regard to party com-
mittees and discipline inspection work). Everywhere else in the NDL the
military's subordination to the state is made abundantly clear, e.g.:
• (Article 5): 'The state shall exercise unified leadership over national
defence activities.'
• (Article 7): 'The Chinese People's Liberation Army and the Chinese
People's Armed Police shall carry out activities to support the
government... .'
• (Article 10): 'The Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress shall decide on the proclamation of a state of war and on
general mobilization or partial mobilization in accordance with
provisions of the constitution, and shall exercise other functions
and powers in national defence as prescribed by the constitution.'
• (Article 11): 'The President of the People's Republic of China shall
proclaim a state of war and issue mobilization orders in pursuance
with the decisions of the National People's Congress and its Standing
Committee... .'
• (Article 12): 'The State Council shall direct and administer the
building of national defence and exercise the following functions
and powers' (nine categories of responsibilities, including fiscal
appropriation).
• (Article 13): 'The Central Military Commission shall direct the armed
forces of the country and exercise the following functions and
powers' (ten categories).
• (Article 14): 'The State Council and Central Military Commission
may call co-ordination meetings according to circumstances to solve
problems concerning national defence.'
In numerous other articles, the NDL stipulates responsibilities of the
state for national defence matters. The absence of mention of the CCP is
striking in this important law, which signals an important shift in civil-
military relations.
The shift signalled in the NDL was explicated further in the 1998
National Defence White Paper. While the White Paper includes the sin-
gle clause that 'Given the new historical conditions, the Chinese army
upholds the absolute leadership of the CCP...,' greater emphasis is placed
on the NPC, State Council and CMC as the institutions controlling the
PLA, e.g.:
In accordance with the Constitution, the National Defence Law and other
relevant laws, China has established and improved its national defence system.
The state exercises unified leadership over defence-related activities. The NPC of the
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PRC is the highest organ of state power. It decides on questions of war and
peace, and exercises other defence-related functions and powers provided for
in the Constitution ... The State Council directs and administrates national defence
work, and the CMC directs and assumes unified command of the nation's armed
forces ... The active components of the PLA comprise the state's standing army ... The
state exercises unified leadership and planned control over defence research and
production. The State Council leads and administrates defence research and production,
as well as defence expenditure and assets. The CMC approves the military equipment
system of the armed forces and military equipment development plans and
programs ... in co-ordination with the State Council, and manages defence
outlays and assets jointly with the State Council. The state practises a state military
supplies order system to guarantee the acquisition of weapons and other war
materials. The state practises a financial allocations system for defence spending.
It decides the size, structure and location of defence assets and the adjustment
and disposal of these assets in accordance with the needs of national defence
and economic construction. The State Council and CMC jointly lead
mobilization preparation and implementation work.25  [emphasis added by author]
The adoption of the NDL provides evidence that the PLA is being
placed increasingly under state control with the concomitant removal
of party controls. To be sure, ambiguities remain. For example, it is un-
clear if references to the Central Military Commission mean the state or
party CMC. This may be a moot point given that the membership com-
position of these two bodies is currently identical, although the lan-
guage describing the CMC strongly suggests that its relationship to the
armed forces is either one of joint administration with the State Council
or merely 'line authority' to implement decisions, whereas broad deci-
sion-making authority seems to rest ultimately with the State Council,
NPC Standing Committee and President of the republic. But, here, am-
biguity exists insofar as Jiang Zemin concurrently holds the offices of
President, CCP General Secretary, and CMC Chairman. Only when the
President no longer heads the party but directs the CMC (as may occur
in 2002 at the 16th Party Congress) will we know for sure that the party-
army link has been fully severed. Another sign would be if the CMC
were to become a body solely composed of military officers (similar to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff) and the Minister of Defence were a civilian.
While one should have little doubt that the Chinese Communist Party
and its leadership remain the ultimate source of political power and
authority in China, it does seem clear that these steps taken in 1997-98
and subsequently are efforts to disentangle the military from party con-
trol. While the 1975 and 1978 national constitutions both explicitly sub-
ordinated the armed forces to the command of the CCP and its Chair-
man, that is no longer the case. Even much of the ambiguity of the early
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1990s is being clarified.26  Of course, it is difficult to determine the ex-
tent to which these reforms are taking root normatively and psycho-
logically in the army, state and society. Interviews with PLA officers in
the late-1990s still suggest substantial ambiguity over the issue of state
versus party control. In fact, to many it remains a non-issue. When asked
whether the armed forces are subordinate to the state or party, some
officers have a puzzled look and respond, 'What do you mean? Of
course, the PLA is loyal to the party! The party rules the country and
the PLA defends it!'27  For many in the PLA, as this officer's response
illustrates, the issue is precisely one of loyalty rather than constitutional
control, and many still see the CCP as synonymous with the state and
country! If orders came to defend the nation against an external oppo-
nent or enforce internal security, few officers or soldiers would ques-
tion whether the order ultimately came from the CMC, State Council,
NPC Standing Committee, PRC President or CCP General Secretary.
While there have clearly been attempts to demarcate the parameters of
authority between party, army and state by law, there still exists an essen-
tial fusion of the three – with ultimate party control – in the minds of most
Chinese citizens. After 70 years of party control and symbiotic fusion be-
tween the three, it is not easy to redefine these interrelationships.
The continued ambiguity is also reflected in PLA publications and
materials used by the General Political Department(GPD). Authorita-
tive materials published to explain the new National Defence Law tend
to emphasize the state's control over the armed forces, while GPD ma-
terials tend to take the opposite tack and emphasize party leadership.
The standard textbook used for 'political work' in the armed forces, pub-
lished after the promulgation of the National Defence Law, is quite explicit
about the CCP's relationship to the PLA.28  It states unambiguously:
The party's absolute leadership over the army is a fundamental feature of army
building ... The CCP should be our army's only and independent leader and
commander ... At no time can the CCP share authority over the military with
other parties or organizations ... If the Communist Party loses its military
authority, it will have no status ... Our army is an armed group to carry out the
party's political tasks.29
The GPD volume is also explicit that the PLA is organizationally subor-
dinate to the CCP Central Committee and Party's CMC.30  This runs in direct
contradiction to the NDL and line of authority discussed above. Nowhere does
the volume mention the role of state President, NPC, State Council, or state
more generally. Perhaps most interesting is the extent to which the 'bourgeois'
notion of state control of the armed forces is sharply criticized:
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Bourgeois liberal elements' advocacy of the military's “non-party-fication” (jundui
feidanghua) is nonsense. In modern society there is no army that is not involved in
politics and, essentially, there is no army not controlled by a ruling party. In Western
capitalist countries, which practise the multi-party system, armies superficially do
not belong to the party but to the state. But, in essence, it is a military that is led by
the capitalist class and its ruling agents, the party ... Therefore, behind the state there
are always capitalist parties that lead and command armies, and carry out capitalist
dictatorship. Capitalist parties are never neutral in politics ... The basic content of
this involvement is to oppress the proletariat and people's revolutions internally,
and carry out invasion and expansion externally ... We must never allow ourselves
to copy the Western capitalist countries' model, and never allow the excuse of the
state's leadership over the army to deny the party's leadership over the army. Political
work in our armed forces should criticize the absurd theory of a “non-party-fied
army”, and should emphasize and consistently insist on the absolute leadership
over the army and ensure that our army is under the party's absolute leadership
forever.31
In contrast, PLA materials used to explain the National Defence Law
to troops take a very different approach by emphasizing state control.32
Unlike the GPD source above, this volume states unambiguously, 'Na-
tional defence is one of the state's functions, and therefore the leader-
ship and management of national defence is an important expression
for state organs to realize their state functions.'33  This volume expli-
cates in 550 pages the various ways and justifications for state control
over the military in China. It states that the head of state exercises 'com-
manding power over the armed forces,' but subsequently states that
this 'commanding power' is 'exercised by the CMC Chairman'.34  This is
not a problem at present as Jiang Zemin occupies both positions, but
this has not historically always been the case (perhaps it is to indicate
that the CMC Chairman and state President will henceforth be one and
the same individual). It states clearly that the NPC Standing Commit-
tee is the 'highest organ of state power' and that the 'CMC is subordi-
nate to the highest organ of state power,' but then confuses matters by
stating that 'it is also subordinate to the CCP Central Committee.'35  In a
telling paragraph (that should not be surprising but makes mockery of
efforts to separate and strengthen state power), the volume explains:
'Insisting on the party's leadership over the army is important in realiz-
ing the party's leadership over the state ... Due to historical reasons, the army
is actually led by the Party's CMC.'36  The volume then goes on to define
and justify various mechanisms that have been put into place to in-
crease state supervision over various aspects of the military matters.
Discussions in the Chinese military media, such as the army news-
paper Liberation Army Daily, also continue to indicate that the debate
over party vs. state control of the armed forces remains alive. A sharp
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unsigned article in April 2001 attacked 'Western hostile forces that vig-
orously advocate the armed forces should be “separated from the party”
(fei dang hua), “depoliticized” (fei zhengzhi hua) and “placed under the
state” (guojia hua).' The article went on to add that, 'This is a corrosive
agent that vainly attempts to weaken and do away with the CCP lead-
ership and tries to disintegrate the soul of our armed forces, and is the
great enemy of our party, state, and armed forces.'37
Prospects for the Future
Despite efforts to legislate and codify increased state/government author-
ity over the PLA, the essential control by the CCP remains apparent (even
if the symbiosis has become attenuated). If anything, there appears to be
an ongoing struggle between the party and the state, but the winner is
likely to be the military as it exerts increased autonomy from both.
Changes in the interrelationship of party, army and state in contempo-
rary China must also be viewed in the context of emerging patterns of
civil-military relations across Asia. With few exceptions (North Korea, Vi-
etnam), civil-military relations in East, Southeast and South Asia have been
fundamentally redefined in recent years in the process of democratiza-
tion. In a number of countries that have known harsh authoritarian and
military rule (South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand,
Bangladesh and Pakistan), the armed forces have been removed from po-
litical power and influence, made accountable to sovereign legislatures,
and returned to the barracks. Militaries in mufti have been replaced by
democratically elected civilians. In all of these countries, the emasculation
of political power and praetorian tendencies of the militaries has been a
crucial element in establishing democratic institutions and rule. The trend
in Asia follows that of Latin America and Africa.
The experiences of these countries, but particularly Taiwan, are sug-
gestive for future civil-military relations in China. Thus far, the emerg-
ing literature on the process of democratic transition in Asia has paid
relatively little attention to the civil-military dimension,38  although it is
viewed as an important variable in the comparative literature.39  More
comparative research needs to be done on Asian militaries and civil-
military relations.40  Scholars of the PLA and Chinese politics need to
place the recent changes in civil-military relations in the PRC outlined
above in this broader regional context, while comparativists need to
look more closely at the Chinese case. The current state of politics in the
PRC certainly does not suggest that a creeping transition to democracy
is silently taking place,41  as the CCP retains its grip on power. But, at
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the same time, we must not mistake the potential significance of the
legislative efforts to subordinate the PLA to state control.
The Chinese case must also be placed in the comparative context of
former socialist states led by communist parties.42  Broadly speaking, the
experiences of the former Soviet and East European militaries suggest that
professionalization and party control are by no means mutually exclusive,
but in not a single case were these militaries consciously placed under
state control via legislative means. Indeed in many cases, they fought (un-
successfully) to save their ruling communist parties.43  The problem for the
Chinese military has never been to subordinate itself to civilian authority,
but rather to state control. Also, unlike the Soviet and East European expe-
riences, the PLA has exhibited a long-standing tension between
professionalization and attempts of politicization by the CCP.44
In these respects, the Chinese military is moving – or rather is being
moved – into an entirely new era of civil-military relations and corporate
professionalism. As such, one would surmise that the PLA will not shirk
from the task of defending national security against external enemies – but
will it do so again against internal enemies that may threaten the rule of
the Communist Party? This will be the ultimate test of the redefined rela-
tionship of the army to the party and state in China.
David Shambaugh is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, and
Director of the China Policy Program, at the George Washington University.
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